We specify an equilibrium model of car ownership with private information where individuals sell and purchase new and second-hand cars over their life-cycle. Private information induces a transaction cost and distorts the market reducing the value of a car as a savings instrument. We estimate the model using data on car ownership in Denmark, linked to register data. The lemons penalty is estimated to be 18% of the price in the first year of ownership, declining with the length of ownership. It leads to large reductions in the turnover of cars and in the probability of downgrading at job loss.
Introduction
As is the case with many durable goods, car owners know more about their own car quality than buyers: this affects the price that buyers are willing to pay, and in turn the quality of cars that car owners are willing to sell, Akerlof (1970) . Private information introduces a transaction cost which is endogenous to the quality of cars that are sold in equilibrium and directly affects the quantity of cars sold and how long cars are owned for. The aim of this paper is to quantify the size of this transaction cost, which we term the lemons penalty. More generally, the aim is to understand the importance of private information and its role in distorting the durable goods market, changing the volume of transactions and the value of assets, and to show how these distortions affect households.
Beyond understanding the market for durables and characterizing the impact of asymmetric information on prices this study has direct implications for consumption smoothing and the way the composition of household assets can affect self-insurance: if the endogenous transaction costs are very high then the use of these durables as assets for consumption smoothing will be restricted and limit the self-insurance capability of households. Cars are an interesting durable to study because they often constitute a large proportion of assets, especially for non-home-owners.
The lemons penalty reflects the difference between the average quality in the population and the average quality of cars sold, given any observed characteristics. Asymmetric information about the quality of cars means dealers will pay less than the expected value of cars that are owned in the population and this will affect who sells a car. This price discount is the lemons penalty. To quantify the lemons penalty we develop an equilibrium model of the car market, with individuals being lifecycle consumers facing stochastic income and being subject to liquidity constraints. Normally, with such a lemons problem the market for second hand cars should unravel completely. However, in our equilibrium model the existence of the market is supported by the fact that some people are compelled to sell their car for liquidity purposes, following adverse income shocks. Since these shocks are orthogonal to the unobserved characteristics of the car, the forced sales are of an average quality.
Thus the average quality of cars in the second hand market is driven by the distribution of the shocks to car quality and the distribution of income shocks themselves. We estimate our model on Danish population register data which includes information about car ownership and we are able to link in dealer resale prices. The key to identification is information on second hand car sales by duration of ownership. Using the model we can then establish the extent of the lemons penalty, by quantifying the average quality in the population and the average quality of cars put on the market through the equilibrium of the model. Asymmetric information may arise in different sides of the car market. However, we assume that dealers have sufficient access to credit or are large enough to have the ability to offer guarantees to buyers of second-hand cars that solves the lemons issue at that part of the second hand market. Dealers can sell cars of different quality but we assume the presence of guarantees makes this as good as observable. Thus the only point at which asymmetric information is an issue is when private individuals sell to dealers. This market structure also explains why the private-to-private market is very limited and indeed in our paper we assume this market away.
To define and quantify the lemons penalty, and to understand the distributional implications of the penalty, we specify and estimate a stochastic life-cycle equilibrium model of car ownership, consumption and other asset accumulation. We assume cars depreciate at a stochastic rate, with at least part of this depreciation being private information to the owner. Additionally, we allow for a deterministic depreciation which is known and is the minimum amount of depreciation that can occur.
For simplicity, we assume individuals sell cars to car dealers and purchase either new cars or secondhand cars from dealers or choose not to own a car at all. Dealers buy cars from households without knowing their exact quality, fix them and sell them back to households as second hand cars. Dealers are offered cars that on average are of lower quality than similar cars in the population. Dealers therefore pay a lower price than they would have done if there was no asymmetric information and this difference is the lemons penalty. Crucially for the support of the equilibrium, some people are forced into selling their car due to idiosyncratic financial shocks.
For the purposes of quantifying the lemons penalty, we argue that modelling asset accumulation in addition to wealth held in cars is critical. The lemons penalty is an equilibrium concept that depends on the number and type of cars flowing in and out of the car market. The rate at which cars are bought and sold depends on individual access to credit and their ability to accumulate savings to purchase cars. Attanasio et al. (2008) and Alessie et al. (1997) highlight the importance of credit conditions for car demand, and we also document that car transactions are associated with substantial changes in financial asset holdings in our data. 1 We estimate the model using high quality Danish population-wide administrative register data for the period with complete information about car ownership 1992-2009. The register data is linked to longitudinal income-tax records with information about income and wealth of the owners as well as to information on the second-hand prices for cars. The core data set is the Central Register of Motor Vehicles (CRMV) from which we have data covering the period 1992-2009. This register contains information about the entire population of cars registered with Danish number plates. These are then merged with prices of all new and used cars on the market in the same period and with the individual register data on income, wealth and family characteristics. To the best of our knowledge no other data set collects longitudinal information about cars, income and wealth, and we are going to exploit 1 In Figure 8 on Appendix A we document using the administrative data that financial asset holdings change significantly at the time where households buy cars. Including savings in the model is critical, as we can otherwise not match key aspects of the data. Conceptually, this arises because without other means of saving, the purchase of a car must be financed by sacrificing current consumption and this dramatically reduces the flows in and out of the car market.
these unique features of the data to inform the model.
We use a method of simulated moments estimator (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989) using data for households where the oldest household member is aged 30-60 in the period 1992 to 2009. Our approach is to choose the parameters to minimize the relative deviations between moments calculated in the data and corresponding simulated moments, where the targeted moments include the ownership rates of cars by age and by education, the fraction of people who buy new cars by age and by education, the percentage of cars being sold after being owned for 2, 4, and 6 years, average ownership duration of cars, and holdings of financial assets.
The lemons penalty is found to be particularly large early on in ownership. This reflects the difference between the average quality in the population and the average quality of cars sold. We find that a car that has been owned for just 1-year has the biggest lemons penalty when it is sold:
18% of the equilibrium price in the first year of ownership. In the second year it is still substantial:
8% of the equilibrium price in the second year of ownership. Thereafter, the lemons penalty declines quickly as ownership duration increases. The high lemons penalty for cars of short ownership duration suppresses their transactions, and this in turn reinforces the size of the penalty as it is mainly those with particularly low quality cars who will sell. On the other hand, we stress that the second hand car market does not collapse completely because individuals have different motives for selling their cars: negative income shocks lead some individuals to sell high quality cars despite the lemons penalty they then have to pay. Additionally, the lemons penalty has distributional consequences: owners of good quality cars loose and owners of 'lemons' benefit from the asymmetric information. The lemons penalty is also found to delay replacement substantially and also reduces probability of downgrading at job loss.
A significant amount of previous papers have modelled households ownership and replacement of cars and recognized that the car replacement decision is associated with transactions costs. Lam (1991), Eberly (1994) , Attanasio (2000) , Foote, Hurst, and Leahy (2000) present Ss-models of car ownership where exogenous transaction costs create inaction regions, or Ss-bands, within which the household does not up-or downgrade the car. Generally, Ss-models are concerned with the consumer decision and do not model the endogenous termination of prices in the second hand market and hence do not provide an explicit economic explanation of why transaction costs vary as the supply of cars to the secondary market changes. Koujianou Goldberg (1995) focuses on the market for new cars and consequently is not concerned directly with the pricing in the second hand market. This paper connects with the literature emphasizing the interaction between the market for new cars and the used car market. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) incorporate adverse selection in to a dynamic model and examine the interactions between new and used car markets to show, among other things, that the used car market does not shut down in the presence of adverse selection. A further literature has focused on the effect of policies that can potentially affect the secondary market for cars, such as scrappage subsidies and gasoline prices. Schiraldi (2011) develops and estimates a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for new and used cars and use the estimated model to evaluate the impact of scrappage subsidies. He proposes a strategy for identifying transaction costs, but assumes that the quality of used cars is common knowledge among agents, so that there is no adverse selection problem. Busse et al. (2013) model the effect of changing gasoline prices on equilibrium prices of new and used cars to learn about how consumers trade off capital costs and ongoing user costs of cars, but not how consumers change their valuation of new and used cars. Gavazza et al (2014) develop an equilibrium model of the primary and secondary market for cars to learn about how differences in the characteristics of these markets can explain observed differences between the US and French car markets. Critical in relation to our study is that Gavazza et al. (2014) assume exogenous transaction costs in the market for used cars and therefore do not model how asymmetric information about the quality of cars in the secondary markets varies endogenously. Adda and Cooper (2000) model demand for new cars and how this interacts with the cost of replacing a used with a new car and use this model to examine the effect of scrappage subsidies in France. They do not model trade in the secondary market for cars and hence ignore the issue of adverse selection in the market for used cars.
The papers cited are concerned with how primary markets interact with secondary markets and/or how specific policies affecting the second hand market, such as scrappage subsidies, affect the primary market, but they do not model how the lemons penalty is endogenously determined. In this paper we emphasize how variations in household resources together with the car market determine the prices of second hand cars and thus how the lemons penalty is determined. The key contribution is to assess the importance of asymmetric information on the car market by developing a quantified dynamic general equilibrium model of the car market. In the model, we explicitly model demand and supply of cars to the secondary market while allowing for asymmetric information about the quality of used cars. The key parameters of the model are estimated using very detailed and high quality data about household income fluctuations and car replacement decisions.
An important characteristic of durable goods is that they have an asset value as well as delivering a flow of consumption services. Consequently durable goods have the potential to act as a savings instrument that can be used to provide self-insurance when faced with adverse income shocks, depending on the cost of liquidation. To take this into account, we explicitly model cars as an asset accumulation device. Our study thus links up to an extensive literature about consumption smoothing and shocks: Deaton (1991) , Crossley (2009), Blundell et al. (2008) , Low et al. (2010) , and Kaplan, Violante (2014) . If there is no private information (generating a transaction cost), then a durable good is like a non-durable good in that there is perfect reversibility. The transaction cost induced by asymmetry introduces an irreversibility that reduces the value of a durable as an asset that can be used to smooth consumption. A key feature of our approach is the recognition that transaction costs are in part endogenous and driven by current economic circumstances. Fluctuations in economic circumstances, such as through recessions, will lead to changes in the lemons penalty: the penalty is greater when there are fewer forced sales, such as those arising due to unemployment shocks.
Our estimated model allows us not only to identify the transaction costs but also to quantify the self-insurance value of cars and the extent by which this is reduced by asymmetric information. We investigate the importance of downgrading after an adverse labour income shock due to job loss. We first verify that the model is able to replicate the downgrading-upon-job-loss pattern in the data, a moment that was not used for estimating the model. We then move on and use the model to explore the implications of asymmetric information for the extent of downgrading. When information is symmetric, sellers receive a price that reflects the actual quality of cars and therefore owners are willing to sell their car even if it has been bought recently and is of high quality. In this case, owners downgrade in order to liquidate the assets value which can then be used for non-car spending. When there is asymmetric information, car owners are less willing to sell cars that have been bought recently and are of high quality: the offered price does not reflect the true quality of the car but rather reflects the average quality of cars for sale.
The next section presents the model and details about the solution method. Section 3 presents and describes the data. Section 4 outlines the estimation approach and and section 5 presents the results on the lemons penalty. In section 6 we investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the downgrading of cars. Section 7 concludes.
Model of the Car Market
The economy is stationary and consists of T overlapping generations. Households are life-cycle expected utility maximizers. They draw utility from cars and from other consumption and they face an exogenous but stochastic stream of income. Their choices are over consumption, car purchase or sale and saving in a liquid asset. All car transactions are mediated by dealers. We denote a period in the life-cycle by t and this should be understood as age. We first describe the nature of cars, then the household problem, and finally equilibrium in the car market.
A period in the model is 1 year. Consumers enter the model at age 21, retire after age 61 and leave the model at age 79. In Denmark, a drivers license can be held from age 18 and is valid until death, subject to checks after age 70.
Cars and Dealers
A car, owned by individual i in period t, has quality q it and ownership duration z it ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,z}. 2 Quality is one-dimensional and evolves over time, but cars differ in their type. Households can buy any one of three types of car: new, second-hand or bangers. We normalize the quality of second hand cars sold by dealers to be 1 when they are sold. A banger is a car at the minimum level of quality.
We use the term "Regular cars" to describe those bought either as new or as second-hand.
Each period, a regular car receives a persistent and idiosyncratic (for individual i that is) quality shock:
(1)
Quality cannot be lower than the minimum quality q b , which is the quality of a banger. The term d is the deterministic depreciation factor. The variable ε ∈ [0, 1] is the additional stochastic depreciation factor, which is observable only by the owner and follows a beta distribution ε ∼ B (η 1 , η 2 ). We contrast our model in Section 5 with the case of symmetric information when all shocks are publicly observed to highlight the implications of asymmetric information. We allow for two further changes to quality: first, a car becomes a banger when it has been owned for more thanz years, or if it suffers a "banger quality shock', which occurs with probability δ r . Second, a banger has to be scrapped if it receives a "scrappage quality shock" with probability δ b . Banger quality is assumed fully observable.
A car can only be bought or sold using a dealer as an intermediary. 3 The only observable characteristic of a used car is how long it has been owned, z, and consequently its price only depends on this characteristic. Thus, a used car of ownership duration z can be sold to a dealer at dealer price p d z . This dealer purchase price p d 1 , p d 2 , . . . , p d z is endogenous, and depends on the distribution of car quality among private sellers. The price of fixed second-hand cars sold by dealers is p u . As fixed second-hand cars are of quality 1, p u can also be thought of as the price for a unit of quality.
Consistent with modelling the car market of a small open economy, we assume an internationally set price for new cars p n , and that the supply of new cars is infinitely elastic. However, the second hand car market is purely domestic with prices locally determined in relation to the internationally fixed price of new cars.
Dealers are profit-maximizing, but free entry means they make zero profits. A dealer buys a used car from a household and then learns the true quality of that particular car. The dealer fixes the car to have quality 1 (the max) and sells it on as a second hand car, with ownership duration 0. The average quality of cars of duration z that are sold to dealers isq z , which is determined by who chooses to sell cars in equilibrium, and is a function of all prices. On average, to fix a car dealers have to improve the quality fromq z to 1 at a cost of p u (1 −q z ). The zero profit condition for the dealer trading at a given ownership duration, z, is
Thus the price paid by a dealer for a car of average quality and ownership duration z is equal to the expected value of the car priced at the resale price.
Our focus is on the lemons penalty that arises because of private information that accumulates during the ownership period, always assuming that at the moment of purchase from the dealer there is no information problem. We therefore simplify the problem and only keep track of the length of ownership and not of the age of the car since it was new. This is based on the assumption that the car-repair by the dealer resets the asymmetric information and the quality of the car sold is fixed to 1. A way to think of this is that the dealer offers a guarantee thus removing any concern of hidden defects. 4 By contrast, the quality of cars that dealers are buying from households is unknown to the dealer.
Households
A household, i, can own at most one car at a time. 5 Households have education level, e, which is either high or low, according to the education of the household head. The level of education determines both preferences and the income process. Within period t utility function, defined over consumption and cars, is assumed to take the CRRA form:
The parameter α e determines the utility value of owning a car. θ e it indicates the relative preference between car types
The parameter θ f e means people may value new cars differently from second hand cars which have been fixed by dealers, despite the same underlying quality, q. And θ b e means people may also value bangers differently.
The household holds liquid assets a it at the beginning of period t. The evolution of the liquid asset is governed by:
Where B it = 1 if the household buys a car, and S it = 1 if the household sells a car. The purchase price, p B is equal to p n if it is a new car; p u if a second-hand car; or p b if a banger. The selling price depends on ownership duration: p S = p d z if the car has been owned for z periods, and p S = p b if it is a banger, independent of ownership duration.
We assume that the maximum amount of borrowing is the sale price of a car that has been owned for an additional year. This allows the use of credit to purchase a car, and the amount of credit is dependent on equilibrium prices. Hence we assume that
Cars are a store of credit up to the expected (equilibrium) resale value p d z for cars of ownership duration z. Households can access wealth in cars only by selling. If a car randomly turns into a banger (rather than by the gradual process of aging), the owner receives an insurance payment which equals to the collateral value of the car. This is to insure the owner from bankruptcy.
In the standard life-cycle model there is one asset that represents the entire accumulated net wealth of the household. Our model includes a second asset, cars, which is distinct from the liquid asset both because cars generate a flow of utility and because cars are less liquid due to the endogenous transaction costs. This difference in the properties of the assets is introduced in order to capture the effect of illiquid assets on the ability of households to smooth out shocks.
We assume a state pension with a replacement rate of 100 percent. This is higher than the actual replacement rate in Denmark, but it allows us to match observed liquid saving. Moreover, it simplifies the modelling of the life cycle savings motive and allows us to focus on accumulation of assets for precautionary purposes and car buying, which are the critical margins in our application.
Income Households receive an uncertain flow of labour income y it depending on their level of education e: Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos, 2013) . To capture this we allow the original realization of the shock to persist, with an effect that depreciates at an annual rate ρ e . U it is a dummy variable equal to one if household i is unemployed in year t.
Value Functions and Household Choices
In each period households in the model need to decide how much to consume and how much to save, which is as in the standard life-cycle model, with the difference here that they also need to decide on car ownership. Specifically, a household that does not own a car has to decide whether and what type to buy. Car owners need to decide whether to keep or sell their car, possibly replacing it with a new car, a fixed used car from a dealer or downgrading to a banger. These decisions are made by comparing value functions for each action. Thus, the problem is a mixture of optimization with respect to continuous decisions and discrete choices.
We first define the state variable Ω s it which defines the position of the household at the start of period t. In all cases the state space includes a it and income y it . For s = 0 the household enters the period with no car and for s = b the starting position is a banger. When s = n the individual already owns a car that was new at the time of purchase, while for s = u they own a car originally bought as used. In the latter two cases the state space includes the duration of ownership z it and the current quality q it which results from past depreciation shocks. Quality is normalized to 1 for those buying a car, i.e. when z it = 0. We now define
where n 1 and u 1 signifies a purchase of a car (new or used respectively), which by definition always has quality 1; n q and u q signifies keeping the existing car with its associated quality q.
Consider first a household who decides not to own a car in period t. This will affect utility in period t and the household will start the next period with no car affecting the relevant state space.
The corresponding conditional value function is given by:
For the household who decides to own a banger in period t, their ownership type at the start of period t + 1 is given by θ e it+1 = θ b e , but the banger may become scrapped with probability δ b . z it and q it are not in the state space for banger-owners because the quality is uniform and ownership duration as such does not matter. Thus the corresponding value function becomes
A household with a car (used or new) has a conditional value function of:
for k = n, u and s = 0, b, n, u
In the above δ r is the probability that the car owned in t becomes a banger at the start of the next period t + 1. If ownership duration exceedsz, the car becomes a banger in the following period for sure (δ r = 1). The utility enjoyed by the car depends on whether it was originally bought as new, in which case θ e it = θ f e or was bought used from a dealer θ e it = 1. An individual entering the period with any type of car can choose to buy a new or used car, but that purchased car will always have quality fixed to 1. However, if they entered the period with a car which they decide to keep, then their utility will depend on the given quality q it , which is driven by depreciation rather than directly by choice. Thus the available set of choices depends on the state space at the start of the period. The optimal choice is determined by comparing the values in period t.
The relevant expression defining the optimal value function is as in equation (7) but with the timing changed from t + 1 to t.
Determining Dealer Purchase Prices: Equilibrium
The market for cars is characterized by the price of new cars (p n ),z prices for each ownership duration of a second-hand car (p d 1 , . . . , p d z ), the price of bangers (p b ) and the price for used fixed cars purchased by households from the dealer (p u ). Households take these prices as given in making their decisions.
We model a stationary economy with equal-sized generations of life-cycle households, where prices are fixed over time and can only change as a result of factors that change the demand for cars and the technology for consumption smoothing, such as welfare policies insuring income or perhaps scrappage subsidies. We now describe how these prices are determined in equilibrium.
The key issue is that of asymmetric information. Car owners receive depreciation shocks which are not observable by the dealers who are potential buyers. We assume that only the ownership duration of the car is observable. Moreover we also assume that the dealer cannot observe characteristics of the household that may be pertinent to the motive for selling the car. Indeed we will assume that only one price is quoted for each car with a particular ownership duration. Given this, the market suffers from adverse selection because at any given price households with cars of lower than expected quality will have an incentive to sell, while those with better than expected quality will not wish to participate in the market. However, the market does not close down because a number of households, who cannot be separately identified, need to sell their cars for consumption smoothing purposes due to income shocks.
To determine equilibrium prices we first assume that the price of new cars is exogenous and fixed:
Denmark produces no cars and is too small to affect international prices. Implicit in the price of new cars are the (heavy) taxes that Denmark imposes. These then affect the prices of second-hand cars in equilibrium. We use the data directly to determine the price of a banger. Given our definition, a banger can be characterized as having 13% of the quality of a fully fixed car.
In determining the price of cars that dealers are willing to pay, the key component is the average quality of cars of given ownership duration coming to the marketq z = E q i |z, p n , p u , p b , p d 1 , . . . , p d z , sale . Because individual quality is private information, dealers will have to offer a pooling price across all qualities given the observable characteristics, which here is just the duration of ownership. This implies some households will be overpaid, in the sense that the hidden quality of the car is worse than average and others would be underpaid, making a loss.
In the standard Akerlof (1970) setting, this pooled pricing would lead to the market unravelling since those loosing out would refuse to sell, making the quality pool worse, and thus leading to a decline in the purchase price and so on. However, in our model the existence of the market is supported by two factors. First, there is utility gain from upgrading. An important reason to sell an old car is to enjoy the higher quality offered by a new one, and quality declines with duration of ownership. Second, some households have to sell because of adverse income shocks. Their need to smooth such shocks leads them to accept losses. It is precisely this mechanism that makes cars an imperfect smoothing tool and defines the transaction costs as endogenous.
To pin down the prices that dealers are willing to pay p d 1 , . . . , p d z , we impose equality between the number of cars purchased (and fixed) and the number of cars sold by the dealer. In our model the dealer does not hoard cars and indeed has no incentive to do so since the economy is stationary.
Finally, note that the information set of the dealer is crucial. Car dealers cannot discriminate between car sellers in terms of the quality of the cars that they bring to the market. In reality car dealers may to some extent be able to discriminate between car sellers and the quality of cars based on observable characteristics, such education or occupation, but we abstract from this.
Defining equilibrium formally (a) All households maximize utility and dealers maximize profit;
(b) Dealers don't hold inventories: the number of second-hand cars sold by dealers equals the number of cars they bought from households; (c) Dealers make zero profits; (d) The stock of cars is constant.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on Danish administrative data. The core data set is the Central These data are merged with prices of almost any type of new and used car on the market in the same period as is covered by the CRMV. It is possible to follow the price of any given brand-modelvariant-vintage combination from when the car is new and until it is eight years old. The price data are collected by the Association of Danish Car Dealers (DAF) based on market analyses and reports from its members and they reflect the price of cars in a "normal condition" depending on the age of the car. Going forward, we will refer to these prices as 'dealer sales prices' and they define the price at which used cars are bought by individuals from the dealer.
The CRMV also contains information about the identity of the owner of any given car at any given point in time, and this information is used for linking the car information to other administrative records of the owner. In particular, we link the CRMV with income tax records and a number of other administrative registers giving longitudinal information about income, wealth, labour market status, education, and family composition of the car owners. In this way we are able to construct a longitudinal data set, where we can follow the population of Danish households in the period 1992-2009 and give a complete description of their income, wealth and car ownership.
The wealth data can be divided into assets and liabilities, which can further be divided into a number of subcategories. Unfortunately, the definitions of these categories are not stable across the observation period. In particular the definitions change almost yearly in the period 1992-1996, but from 1997 the definitions are stable and it is possible to clearly identify financial wealth. Furthermore, the data are longitudinal and this means that we are able to track decisions about the sales and purchases of cars and how these decisions interact with savings decisions. In this way we are able to examine how households use cars as an asset for smoothing adverse income shocks associated with unemployment events. To the best of our knowledge no other data set collects longitudinal information about cars, income and wealth, and we are going to exploit these unique features of the data to inform the model.
Statistics on Cars and Households
We consider a 10% extract of the population register and we include an observation only if the oldest person in the household is at least 30 years old and at most 60 years old. To these individuals we add the partner, if there is one, and we summarize all the remaining information at the household level. Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for two age groups, 30-40 and 41-60. 6 As expected, younger individuals have less accumulated wealth and are thus more likely to find it difficult to smooth out shocks. We group the summary statistics into three parts providing information about car ownership, the financial situation of the household and demographics.
Car ownership is taxed in two ways in Denmark. There is an annual ownership tax and there is a one-time tax associated with purchasing a new car. The latter, called the registration fee, is the most important amounting to up to 180% of the whole sale price thus making Denmark one of the most expensive countries to purchase a new car in. As a consequence 26-32% of the population depending on age does not own a car at any given point in time, (Table 1 , column 1 and 3). Another consequence of new cars being expensive is that the average age of the car fleet is eight to nine years.
The average level of disposable income is 309 thousand DKK (1 USD ≈6.5 DKK) for the young group and 323 thousand DKK for the middle-aged. A substantial fraction of the population in both age groups hold quite modest amounts of financial assets. This is witnessed by the fact that the median level of financial assets to income is 9 percent for the young group and 15 percent for the 41-60 year old. In fact, around 50 percent of the households in both age groups hold financial assets worth less than one month of disposable income. These low-financial asset households also have little housing equity and are unlikely to be able to use that as a buffer. 60-67 percent of the households in this group have a car. Consequently, the value of the car stock makes up the over-whelming part of their assets. For the median household in this segment the value of the car makes up 86 percent of their total financial and car assets.
Turning to the group of people holding financial assets amounting to more than one months worth of disposable income the picture looks different. A bigger fraction of the households are car owners and the ownership rate increases with age. The young households have little housing equity, but hold significant amounts of financial assets, so that the car only makes up about 34 percent of the sum of car and financial assets. The middle aged group in this segment has far more housing equity and the car stock only makes up 34 percent of the sum of car and financial assets. In other words, this group appears well-prepared for adverse events.
In section 6, we will examine how households use cars to deal with adverse income shocks. For this purpose we consider a sub-sample consisting of households who have been affected by an unemployment event and who owned at least one car in the year preceding the job loss. Since financial wealth is only consistently reported after 1997, we only include individuals who experienced a job loss in 1999 or later, which allows us to examine how financial wealth is adjusted at the time of the unemployment spell. In Table 6 in Section 6, we also show summary statistics for the job-loss sample. In the data, we observe the fraction of the year that a person has been unemployed. We define an unemployment event to have taken place when the fraction of a year in unemployment among the adult household members exceeds three months. For the purposes of this descriptive exercise, we include in the job-loss sample only those households who had at least one car in the year preceding the job loss.
The households in the job-loss sample, naturally, have a slightly lower level of income and the value of their car stock is also slightly lower. However, the value of the car stock out of the sum of financial and car assets is remarkably similar to the overall sample as is the amount of housing equity, and this is the case for both age groups.
Estimation
The unknown parameters characterising the model are the preference parameters, the income process parameters and the dealer purchase car prices.
There are four types of car price in the model. The price of a new car, the price of a fixed second hand car sold by a dealer, the price of a banger, and the prices that dealers pay households for cars of different ownership duration. We observe the list price of new cars and we use the dealer sale prices for used cars to measure the price of fixed second-hand cars. The measurement of these dealer sale prices and the price of bangers is discussed in detail below. The key limitation of the data is that we do not observe dealer purchase car prices, that is transaction prices when dealers buy cars from households.
Consequently we cannot rely on observed prices during estimation, and instead, we need to solve for the equilibrium price for cars of different ownership duration simultaneously with estimation of the preference and other parameters.
This feature make estimation computationally demanding. We therefore separate the estimation into two steps: first, we estimate some parameters outside of the model when the process is exogenous to decisions made in the model, as with the income process, and take others directly from the literature.
Second, we estimate the remaining parameters by using the Method of Simulated Moments. Within this MSM estimation, we generate the vector of prices that households receive when they sell the cars, which is consistent with equilibrium.
Taking as given the set of pre-estimated parameter values, such as those of the income process, the algorithm for this MSM estimation proceeds as follows:
1. Make an initial guess of remaining endogenous parameter values.
2. Find a fixed point for the dealer purchase prices p d z using the zero-profit condition (equation 2), separately for cars of each ownership duration. This is a fixed point problem: as prices change the average qualityq z changes at all ages z.
3. At these equilibrium prices (p d z ), evaluate the criterion function using simulated and actual moments. Since the dealer price of cars is observed at the equilibrium value, we evaluate moments at the prices where the conditions of zero inventory and constant stock of cars over time are satisfied.
4. Parameters are updated and the process is repeated from step 2 until convergence.
Pre-estimated Parameters
The parameter values that are fixed or externally estimated are listed in Table 2 . We assume a risk aversion coefficient of 1.43 (see Blundell et al. 1994) . The interest rate measure is the yield of the two-year Danish government bonds adjusted by consumer price index averaged over 1996-2009, which gives a rate of 1.6%. The remaining parameters in Table 2 are now discussed in turn.
Constructing Dealer Car Prices
We observe data on the list price of new cars. We also observe dealer sale prices, which we relate directly to the price of fixed second-hand cars. Our concept of a fixed second-hand car is the second-hand car at the maximum quality. Our dealers fix cars they buy from households to achieve this quality and then sell them on. From the data we quantify this price in the following way: we use the median value of dealer prices across second-hand cars that are one year old. This determines the price of a fixed second hand car, which we can compare to the observed price of a new car. 7 We normalise the price of the fixed car to one, and this implies the price of a new car, p n = 1.14.
We assume a car can be owned for up to 9 years, i.e.z = 9. We use the year-to-year depreciation rate in the book price, which is 11.2 percent, as the deterministic depreciation rate in the model, i.e. d = 1 − 0.11 = 0.89. We think of bangers as old cars which are of minimal quality and so not subject to asymmetric information. To quantify the value of a typical banger we observe that the weighted average of median book price of cars more than 15 years old is 20 thousand DKK, and we set the banger price in the model to p b = 20 159 = 0.13. This defines the base quality q b = p b p u = 0.13, implying that a banger is worth 13 percent of a fixed second-hand car in terms of quality. We set the annual scrappage rate for for bangers at δ b = 0.073, which is determined by the scrappage rate for cars more than 15 years old in the data. 1992-2009. 8 We define income to be total household disposable income, which includes the effects of taxes and transfers. The sample used for estimation includes those aged 23-60 only, thus avoiding retirement years. Retirement income is assumed riskless.
To estimate the deterministic age profile, we regress log household disposable income on Age t , Age 2 t as well as calendar year dummies and dummy variables for household structure, i.e. dummy for having a partner and five dummies for up to five children.
There are three error components in the residual log income r it : first, v it which is the permanent shock; second, ω it which captures the impact of (an exogenous) unemployment spells on wages; and finally measurement error (or transitory shocks) ν it .
Estimation is based on moments for residual income growth, which depending on the case, take the form
To estimate the variance of the permanent shock σ 2 we use the autocovariance structure of the residual income growth for those who have not had an unemployment spell. It is valid to do this because in our model unemployment represents an exogenous shock to income and hence there is no selection bias. The moments used are as in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) . Given an estimate of σ 2 we can then use the autocovariances for individuals with unemployment spells to estimate the remaining parameters of the income process reported in Table 2 . Further details of the estimation are in Appendix C.
The estimates of σ 2 is 0.018 for the no-college group, and is 0.021 for the some-college group, which by way of comparison are substantially lower than the equivalent numbers in the US. To capture initial dispersion we assume the first draw of the permanent component, v i0 , is drawn from a Normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 v0 . The standard deviations are estimated to be 0.2 for the no-college group and 0.15 for the some-college group based on the dispersion of household earnings at age 21.
Assets We do not include housing and pension wealth explicitly in the model in order to avoid excessive computational complexity but allow for one liquid asset (beyond cars). To correct for the fact that housing and pension wealth are not liquid we prevent individual income from declining before retirement and assume that the replacement rate for retirement income is 100 percent. This effectively implies that asset accumulation in our model is for precautionary purposes only, against unemployment or wage shocks, while at the same time lifetime wealth remains sufficiently high.
Initial conditions
We need to specify the initial conditions for financial assets, car ownership and ownership duration. We compute the empirical distribution of the ratio of financial assets to earnings by education group among households aged 20-26 in the Danish administrative data. We set the initial levels of financial assets to earnings to match this distribution, using 10 different values taken from the deciles of the CDF in the data. Initial financial wealth is computed using this ratio and initial earnings estimated above. The initial car ownership position is either that the household does not own a car, or that it owns a regular car of vintage z ∈ {1, ..., 9} or that it owns a banger. We allocate an equal probability to each of these initial positions at age 21. We compute moments from age 30 by which time the impact of this initial allocation will be diminished.
Estimated parameter values
We estimate the remaining parameters using data for households where the oldest person is aged between 30-60 in the period 1992 to 2009 based on the the simulated method of moments. The standard errors of the structural parameters are computed as in Gourieroux et al. (1993) , where the covariance matrix of the data moments is estimated using the block bootstrap. Table 3 shows the moments we use and how well the model can fit them. These moments pin down 10 parameters, whose estimates are presented in Table 4 and include:
• Parameters common to both education groups: the discount factor β, the arrival rate of a banger shock δ r , and the parameters for the distribution of the private depreciation factor ε ∼ B (η 1 , η 2 ).
• Parameters that are allowed to differ between education groups: the utility benefit of owning car α e , the relative preference for cars bought as new θ f e , and the relative preference for bangers θ b e .
Based on our estimates the distribution of the private depreciation factor is ε ∼ B (14.774, 1.942), which implies a mean of 0.884, and a variance of 0.006. The deterministic depreciation factor d = 0.89, and the overall expected depreciation factor dE (ε) = 0.787 implying the excess quality over and above the basic q b declines on average at a rate of 21.3% a year as shown in equation (1).
Given the estimated utility parameters, households have a higher preference for new cars, and a lower preference for bangers. The positive value of α e implies that cars and consumption are substitutes in utility, in the sense that the cross-partial derivative of utility with respect to c and q is negative. The discount factor β = 0.969 lies within the range of values commonly assumed in dynamic Rust, 1987) . Finally, about 8.4% of cars randomly become bangers each
year (over and above those that reach that state deterministically because of age).
The Lemons Penalty
Our estimates and the structure of the model implies a lemons penalty, i.e, an endogenous transactions cost. This penalty, together with the deterministic depreciation rate defines the time path for how the price changes as the duration of ownership increases. We contrast this with the time path when information about quality is symmetric. For both the asymmetric and symmetric information cases, we show implications for the timing and volume of transactions.
Dealers will purchase cars at a price equal to the expected quality of cars that are being sold.
Asymmetric information means that the expected quality of cars with a given duration of ownership that are offered to dealers will be lower than the expected quality of cars with that ownership duration that are owned in the population. Dealers will therefore pay less than the expected value of cars that are owned in the population.
To define the lemons penalty we need to consider the expected loss incurred by a randomly chosen individual who sells their car at the going price. Thus the lemons penalty is defined as the difference between the average car in the population (irrespective of the decision to sell) and the prevailing dealers equilibrium price. As we show below, a high lemons penalty for newly-bought cars implies that households will hold onto good cars, and the average quality of older cars will be better than otherwise.
The resulting transactions costs/lemons penalty are shown in the top panel of Table 5 labelled "asymmetric information". The first row of Table 5 shows the equilibrium dealer price, which equals the expected value of cars being sold, according to equation (2) and which ensures zero profits. The second row of Table 5 shows the expected value of cars that are owned in the population. The difference between these is the lemons penalty, shown in the third row as a percentage of the equilibrium dealer price. The columns show how the equilibrium price varies with the duration of ownership. This generates a time path for the lemons penalty, which we show explicitly in Figure 1 , and which is unobservable in the data. The size of the lemons penalty initially declines markedly with ownership duration but then stabilizes and even increases again. A car that has been owned for just 1-year has the biggest lemons penalty when it is sold: -0.123, which is 18% of the equilibrium dealer price in the first year of ownership. In the second year it is still substantial: -0.049, which is 8% of the equilibrium price in the second year of ownership. Notes: In the baseline asymmetric information case, the price that a dealer sells a second-hand car is set at p u = 1. Given this price and the price that the dealer pays to private sellers, demand for second-hand cars equals supply, and 13.5% of the population buy a car in any given period. With symmetric information, and a dealer sale price of p u = 1, there is excess demand by households for second-hand cars bought from the dealer. The price p u adjusts so that demand equals supply: p u increases to 1.04, and 29% of the population buy a car in any given period.
The lemons penalty is of course only a penalty for those who are selling a car with quality better than the average. For some, the "penalty" means they receive a price for their car greater than the true quality of the car. Asymmetric information leads to distributional consequences as well as 
Symmetric Information
In our baseline model, the idiosyncratic stochastic shocks affecting car quality are private information.
We compare this assumption to the case where all idiosyncratic shocks are fully observable and so information is symmetric.
In the symmetric information model, a household with a car of quality q j,t can sell it at its true value q j,t p u . Compared to the asymmetric information case, good cars can be sold at a better price in the symmetric information case, while bad cars are at a lower price. The fact that a car can now be be sold at its true quality and this makes makes them more valuable as a store of value. The absence of the lemons penalty means that cars are much more freely traded and total demand for fixed cars increases from 13.5% to 29% of the population. 9
Comparing the 1st and 5th row of Table 5 , we find the average dealer prices of cars with duration of ownership of 1 or 2 years are higher in the symmetric information model than the dealer prices in the asymmetric information model. High quality cars are sold much sooner. Table 5 also shows the dealer prices and the average value of cars in the population that would prevail under symmetric information. These are almost the same; however, interestingly the value of cars sold is slightly higher than the average in the population. This is because some cars end up depreciating less than expected implying that the owners end up with cars of higher quality than expected and desired.
The efficiency loss from asymmetric information is characterized by its impact on the number of transactions that do not occur as a result of asymmetric information. Figure 3 shows how the fraction of cars sold varies with the duration of ownership, and compares this to the asymmetric information case and to the data. Our model with asymmetric information and the lemons penalty fits the transactions observed in the data extremely well. However, as the figure illustrates the number of cars sold under symmetric information would be much higher. In the first 2 years, 85.5% of cars are sold under symmetric information, comparing to only 28.3% approximately in the asymmetric information case. Introducing an exogenous transaction cost to the symmetric information model would dampen the turnover of ownership, but this would have a similar effect on owners of cars regardless of the quality of the car. The point we want to stress is that because the transaction cost in our model is generated by asymmetric information this also distorts the type of cars that are sold as well as the speed with which they are sold.
Unemployment Events and Downgrading
One of the implications of the lemons penalty is that the car stock cannot be adjusted easily in response to an income shock. This reduces the value of the asset as a consumption smoothing device, which can have important welfare implications for low income people with low levels of liquid assets and much of their wealth accounted for by their car. In this section we examine how the propensity to downgrade the car stock is affected by asymmetric information. We start by examining whether the quantified model is able to match data on the propensity to downgrade upon job loss. We then compare simulated responses to unemployment events under the assumptions of symmetric and asymmetric information.
We focus on the probability of downgrading, i.e. selling a car and either replacing it with a banger or not replacing at all.
Comparison to the Data
Evidence on how households respond to job loss was not used in the estimation procedure, and it thus provides some useful validation. We focus on the sample of job-losers and perform an event study for outcomes around the job loss. The event is defined to be the first job loss observed in the period 1999-2009. We include single adult households and couples. 10 The job loss shock generates a time path for disposable income shown in Figure 4 , which matches the income path in the data (not reported). Figure 5 compares the observed downgrading to downgrading in the model. Both the amount of downgrading before job loss and the increase in downgrading on job loss are similar between the data and the asymmetric information case.
Unemployment Shocks under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
For many households, cars are a substantial financial asset. However, the lemons penalty reduces the willingness of households to sell cars of good quality, or even of average quality. This is a transactions cost that reduces the value of holding a car as a way to smooth shocks. When information is symmetric, this transactions cost of selling a car is not present, increasing the value of holding a car as a financial asset. In this section, we compare the responses of households to becoming unemployed when there is asymmetric information to when there is symmetric information.
10 For singles we define a job loss to take place if the person has been out of job for a total of at least 60 days during the year. For couples we define the job loss to take place if the total unemployment accumulates to 120 days when summarized for both partners over the year. This is done to obtain shocks that are of comparable magnitude across singles and couples. Even when conditioning on the length of car ownership, there are differences in which cars are being used for smoothing unemployment shocks. Figure 7 reports how the probability of downgrading differs by the quality of car. Cars are split into four types, relative to the dealer price: very low quality cars, which have quality less than 90% of the average quality being sold; low quality cars which are between 90% and 100% of average quality; good quality cars which are no more than 10% higher quality than the average; and very good quality which are more than 10% better than average. Figure  Figure 6 : Simulated Downgrading by Ownership Duration 7 shows downgrading for asymmetric information on the left-hand side, and symmetric information on the right-hand side. The difference is stark: under asymmetric information, it is the very low quality cars which are being sold to smooth consumption; whereas under symmetric information, it is the very high quality cars which are being sold.
The message from Figure 7 is that the presence of asymmetric information introduces insurance against a car being of low quality: since dealers cannot condition the price on quality because it is unobservable, the owners of bad cars receive a price above the true quality of their car, whereas the owners of good cars receive a price below the true quality. This insurance comes at a price, which is the transactions cost of the lemons penalty, reducing the expected value of the asset. The duration of ownership is fixed at 3 years. There are 4 levels of quality: very poor (quality less than 90% of average among owned cars), poor (between 90% and 100%), good (100% to 110%) and very good (over 110% of average).
Conclusions
In this paper we assess the importance of the lemons penalty in the car market. The lemons penalty exists when car sellers know more about the quality of the car they are selling than buyers, i.e. when there is asymmetric information about the quality of cars being traded. This type of asymmetric information implies that dealers will pay less than the expected value of cars in the population and this will systematically affect who sells a car such that cars put on the market are, on average, of lower quality than the expected quality in the population of cars. This price discount is the lemons penalty, and it is endogenous to the quality of cars that are sold in equilibrium.
In order to quantify the quality of cars in the population and the quality of cars put on the market we formulate and quantify a stochastic life-cycle equilibrium model of car ownership in which dealers buy old cars from households without the dealers knowing the true quality. Car dealers are offered cars that, on average, are of lower quality than similar cars in the population and so the dealers are will only pay a lower price. Households selling above average quality cars therefore receive a lower payment than what they would have if there was no informational asymmetry about the quality of the car and this difference is the lemons penalty. The supply of cars into the used car market varies as households receive news about their income and this affect the average quality of cars entering the secondary market. This mechanism enables us to study how equilibrium prices and the flow of cars in and out of the market is characterized.
Our results show that the lemons penalty is significant in the beginning of the car ownership period and in particular for newly purchased cars. We show that the lemons penalty reduces the transaction volume significantly. If there were full information about the quality of cars in the market and in the population, sellers receive a price that reflects the actual quality of cars, i.e. there is no lemons penalty, and therefore owners are more willing to sell their car if it is of high quality. As a consequence, the composition of cars in the market changes, and are on average, of higher quality and cars are traded more frequently.
Full information brings a gain for people with high quality cars, who are then able to get a price that matches its true quality. This is of particular value for owners of cars that have been bought recently and are of high quality: such owners can now better use the car for countering adverse income shocks than in the asymmetric information environment. The effect is opposite for owners of low quality cars: full information brings a lower price and they will be less able to use the car to smooth during times of low income. For this group, asymmetric information has a benefit and introduces insurance against holding a car of low quality. Asymmetric information has distributional consequences as well as efficiency consequences. Further, this insurance comes at a price -the transactions cost induced by the lemons penalty -which we show reduces significantly the expected asset value of a car, and this has a substantial effect on the market for cars. Further, the transaction cost means that lower income individuals, for whom the car makes up a large fraction of their wealth, are prevented from using this asset efficiently for income smoothing.
A Financial Assets around Time of Car Purchase
This appendix documents how net financial asset holdings fluctuate around the time when households in the sample buy a car in an event study. Net financial asset include bank deposits, shares, bonds, and non-mortgage debt, and net financial assets are measured relative to average disposable income for the household across the years where the household enters the sample. The event is defined to be the first car purchase observed in the period 1999-2009. 
C Income Process
The estimated unconditional autocovariances up to order three are presented in Table 7 for the two education groups. Second-and higher order autocovariances are statistically significant reflecting some persistence in the transitory component. Their size is however very small. 11 Notes: A regular car is a car aged less than 15 years. A banger is a car aged more than 15 years. All economic variables are CPI deflated to the level in 2000 and have been censored at 1st and 99th percentile calendar year by calendar year. Car value refers to the value of the stock of cars. Financial assets includes cash in banks, bonds and stocks. ETV and ETI are based on tax assessed house values. Because of changes in the definition of the debt variables these variables can only be calculated for the years 1997-2009. The joblooser sample includes observations for individuals who have been affected by unemployment events during the period 1999-2009. An unemployment event is defined to take place if the household is exposed to three months of full time unemployment over the year. For two-adult households it is defined to take place if the couple jointly experience at least six months of unemployment within a calendar year. For confidentiality reasons the medians are calculated as the average of 4 observations around the true median. The variance of the unemployment shock σ 2 κ can be estimated using the residual income growth for those employed in t − 1 and unemployed in t, g it,eu = it + ν it + κ it based on the expression σ 2 κ = E g 2 it,eu − σ 2 − 2σ 2 ν , where the subscript eu denotes "from employment to unemployment." The persistence of the unemployment shock ρ e is estimated from the variance of residual income growth for those unemployed in t − 1 and employed in t, g it,ue = it + ν it + ρ e κ it − κ it using the expression ρ 2 e = E g 2 it,ue − σ 2 − 2σ 2 ν − σ 2 κ /σ 2 κ , where the subscript ue denotes "from unemployment to employment." The estimates of ρ e is 0.635 for the No College group, and is 0.734 for the Some College group.
For simplicity, we assume κ it follows a discrete two point distribution with support {κ 1s , κ 2s }, each occurs 50% of the time. κ 1s is positive, representing the unemployment shock leads to a better new job, and κ 2s is negative, representing a serious scarring effect due to unemployment. {κ 1s , κ 2s } are estimated based on the mean and variance of the residual income growth for those employed in t-1 and unemployed in t using minimum distance methods. The estimates are{0.107, −0.245} for the No College group, and is {0.181, −0.286} for the Some College group. Finally, we set the probability of unemployment δ u to be 3.7% for the No College group and 2.5% for the Some College group annually.
D Symmetric Information
After eliminating asymmetric information from the model, the aggregate demand of fixed cars changes, and thus the fixed car price p u changes. Then expected car value also changes, as it is proportional to p u . In order to compare it with asymmetric information model, as a first step, we keep the fixed car price constant, i.e. p u = 1, although this means aggregate demand of fixed cars is greater than aggregate supply. The second panel of Table 8 shows the average dealer prices and the expected value of cars being owned in this case. Notes: In the baseline asymmetric information case, the price that a dealer sells a second-hand car is set at p u = 1. Given this price and the price that the dealer pays to private sellers, demand for second-hand cars equals supply, and 13.5% of the population buy a car in any given period. With symmetric information, the price that a dealer pays to private sellers is equal to the actual quality of that car. Given a dealer sale price of p u = 1, there is excess demand by households for second-hand cars bought from the dealer. This scenario is shown in the second panel where 34.9% of the population want to buy a second-hand car from a dealer, but only 31.6% are selling their cars to the dealer. In the third panel, we allow p u to adjust so that demand equals supply: p u increases to 1.04, and 29% of the population buy a car in any given period.
